Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
Year of publication: |
May 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bhattacharya, Vivek ; Manuelli, Lucas ; Straub, Ludwig |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 175.2018, p. 1-37
|
Subject: | Repeated games | Ambiguity aversion | Imperfect public monitoring | Linearity | Theorie | Theory | Signalling | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Wiederholte Spiele |
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