Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely fi nite), direct, cheap talk.

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Year of publication:	2013-01
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Vida, Péter
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Bayesian game \| pre-play communication \| cheap talk \| communication equilibrium \| correlated equilibrium \| Two Player

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Theoretical Economics, 2013, Vol. 8, no. 1. pp. 95-123.Length: 28 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708889