Implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Hayes, Rachel M. ; Schaefer, Scott |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 31.2000, 2, p. 273-293
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Lohn | Wages | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Theorie | Theory |
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