Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
Martin Van der Linden
| Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Linden, Martin van der |
| Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 73.2017, p. 111-121
|
| Subject: | Mechanism design | Strategy-proofness | Veto | Probabilistic mechanism | Committee selection | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Allokation | Allocation | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.09.003 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011842108