Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Wang, Cheng |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 76.1997, 1, p. 72-105
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Börsenkurs | Share price | Theorie | Theory |
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