Does non-controlling large shareholder monitoring improve CEO incentives?
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Hui, Zhiyang ; Fang, Hongyan |
Published in: |
Emerging markets, finance & trade : a journal of the Society for the Study of Emerging Markets. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1558-0938, ZDB-ID 2095312-4. - Vol. 58.2022, 5, p. 1262-1275
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Subject: | blockholder identity | emerging markets | Non-controlling large shareholder | pay-performance sensitivity | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Schwellenländer | Emerging economies | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Börsenkurs | Share price | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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