Incentives, wages, employment, and the division of labor in teams
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Rauh, Michael T. |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 45.2014, 3, p. 533-552
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Subject: | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Anreiz | Incentives | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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