Incomplete information as a deterrent to crime
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marjit, Sugata ; Rajeev, Meenakshi ; Mukherjee, Diganta |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 16.2000, 4, p. 763-773
|
Subject: | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Kriminalität | Crime | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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