Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games
Year of publication: |
2000
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---|---|
Authors: | Knez, Marc ; Camerer, Colin |
Published in: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. - Elsevier, ISSN 0749-5978. - Vol. 82.2000, 2, p. 194-216
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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