Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information. Copyright The Econometric Society 2002.
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Valimaki, Juuso |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 70.2002, 3, p. 1007-1033
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
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