Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions : an experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
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Authors: | Wilkening, Tom |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 89.2016, p. 193-215
|
Subject: | Persistence of institutions | Equilibrium selection | Information | Experimental economics | Experiment | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | Vertrag | Contract | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement | Experimentelle Ökonomik | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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