Information elicitation and influenza vaccine production
Year of publication: |
January-February 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chick, Stephen E. ; Hasija, Sameer ; Nasiry, Javad |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0030-364X, ZDB-ID 123389-0. - Vol. 65.2017, 1, p. 75-96
|
Subject: | mechanism design | principal-agent modeling | adverse selection | moral hazard | epidemiology | influenza vaccine supply chain | Impfung | Vaccination | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Lieferkette | Supply chain | Epidemie | Epidemic | Infektionskrankheit | Infectious disease | Arzneimittel | Pharmaceuticals | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
-
When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván, (2013)
-
Mechanism design with moral hazard
Kwon, Suehyun, (2017)
-
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Gottlieb, Daniel, (2022)
- More ...
-
Incentive alignment and information elicitation from manufacturers for public goods procurement
Chick, Stephen E., (2012)
-
Information Elicitation and Influenza Vaccine Production
Chick, Stephen E., (2014)
-
Outcomes-Based Reimbursement Policies for Chronic Care Pathways
Zorc, Sasa, (2017)
- More ...