Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aricha, Inbar ; Smorodinsky, Rann |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 42.2013, 4, p. 931-946
|
Subject: | Mechanism design | Information elicitation | Sequential mechanism | Revelation principle | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour |
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