Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case.
We study a market with pair wise meetings of agents and with a one sided information asymmetry regarding the state of the world, which may be "low" or "high." We characterize the set of equilibria of the model, and study its behavior as the market becomes approximately friction less. For any one sided information economy there is an equilibrium where trade occurs at the right price (an ex-post individually rational price). Moreover, there is an open set of economies where in all the equilibria trade occurs at the right price.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Serrano, Roberto ; Yosha, Oved |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 3.1993, 3, p. 481-99
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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