Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser : a characterization of the plurality with a runoff
Year of publication: |
January 2016
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Authors: | Sato, Shin |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 79.2016, p. 11-19
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Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Information | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting |
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