Informational size and incentive compatibility
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | MacLean, Richard P. ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 70.2002, 6, p. 2421-2453
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Subject: | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Anreiz | Incentives | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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