Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | MacLean, Richard P. ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 45.2003, 1, p. 222-241
|
Subject: | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Core | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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