Innovation in long-term care insurance : joint contracts for mitigating relational moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zweifel, Peter |
Published in: |
Insurance / Mathematics & economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6687, ZDB-ID 8864-X. - Vol. 93.2020, p. 116-124
|
Subject: | Innovation in insurance | Joint contracts | Long-term care insurance | Relational moral hazard | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Pflegeversicherung | Innovation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
-
Licensing contracts : control rights, options, and timing
Crama, Pascale, (2017)
-
Venture capital financing of innovation races : conference paper
Kovác, Eugen, (2014)
-
Managing innovation : optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard
Poblete, Joaquín, (2017)
- More ...
-
Plädoyer für risikogerechte Prämien in der Krankenversicherung
Zweifel, Peter, (2003)
-
Investitionen in neue Energietechnologien: Hemmnisfaktor Finanzierung
Madlener, Reinhard, (2006)
-
Potenziale der Globalisierung zugunsten der Umwelt
Zweifel, Peter, (2007)
- More ...