Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Efficiency Wages of the "No-shirking" Type

The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un)employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Vasilev, Aleksandar
Publisher:	Kiel, Hamburg : ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Subject:	indivisible labor \| lotteries \| unobservable effort \| insurance \| no-shirking efficiency wages

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1049607171 [GVK] hdl:10419/184667 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:esprep:184667 [RePEc]
Classification:	E1 - General Aggregative Models ; J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925710