Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages

The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Vasilev, Aleksandar
Publisher:	Kiel, Hamburg : ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Subject:	Indivisible labor \| Lotteries \| Insurance \| Unobservable effort \| fair wages

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1046352717 [GVK] hdl:10419/183615 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:esprep:183615 [RePEc]
Classification:	E1 - General Aggregative Models ; J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011920155