International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game

Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

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Year of publication:	2012-06
Authors:	Holtsmark, Bjart ; Sommervoll, Dag Einar
Institutions:	Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Government of Norway
Subject:	Climate change \| international environmental agreements \| emissions trading \| non-cooperative game theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management ; Q4 - Energy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678276