International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game

Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Holtsmark, Bjart ; Sommervoll, Dag Einar
Publisher:	Oslo : Statistics Norway, Research Department
Subject:	Climate change \| international environmental agreements \| emissions trading \| non-cooperative game theory.

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Series:	Discussion Papers ; 693
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	719725852 [GVK] hdl:10419/192675 [Handle] RePEc:ssb:dispap:693 [RePEc]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management ; Q4 - Energy
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968463