Invariably Suboptimal: An Attempt to Improve the Voting Rules of the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | KIRSCH, WERNER ; LANGNER, JESSICA |
Published in: |
Journal of common market studies : JCMS. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0021-9886, ZDB-ID 30089. - Vol. 49.2011, 6, p. 1317-1339
|
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
Kirsch, Werner, (2010)
-
Invariably suboptimal : an attempt to improve the voting rules of the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon
Kirsch, Werner, (2011)
-
Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
Kirsch, Werner, (2010)
- More ...