Investigating discretion in executive contracting : extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Drake, Katharine D. ; Engel, Ellen ; Martin, Melissa A. |
Published in: |
Review of accounting studies. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7136, ZDB-ID 2004326-0. - Vol. 28.2023, 2, p. 533-569
|
Subject: | Executive compensation and turnover | Private information | Loss firms | Loss persistence | Valuation allowance | Discretion in contracting | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verlust | Loss | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract |
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