Investment with weak contract enforcement: evidence from Hungary during transition
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence relating to the importance of contract enforcement for development. Survey data on Hungarian farms are used to estimate the impact of contract hold-ups on investment. We find that investment is affected by a variety of factors. Contract breaches in the form of delayed payments have a non-linear effect on investment: at high levels, they significantly deter the investment, but not at low levels. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2008; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Cungu, Azeta ; Gow, Hamish ; Swinnen, Johan F. M. ; Vranken, Liesbet |
Published in: |
European Review of Agricultural Economics. - European Association of Agricultural Economists - EAAE, ISSN 1464-3618. - Vol. 35.2008, 1, p. 75-91
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Publisher: |
European Association of Agricultural Economists - EAAE |
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