Investment with Weak Contract Enforcement : Evidence from Hungary During Transition

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence relating to the importance of contract enforcement for development. Survey data on Hungarian farms are used to estimate the impact of contract hold-ups on investment. We find that investment is affected by a variety of factors. Contract breaches in the form of delayed payments have a non-linear effect on investment: at high levels, they significantly deter the investment, but not at low levels

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Year of publication:	[2010]
Authors:	Cungu, Azeta
Other Persons:	Gow, Hamish R. (contributor) ; Swinnen, Johan F. M. (contributor) ; Vranken, Liesbet (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	In: European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 35, Issue 1, pp. 75-91, 2008 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2008 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759125