Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Hummel, Patrick |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 31.2008, 2, p. 257-269
|
Subject: | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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