Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hummel, Patrick |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 34.2010, 1, p. 65-103
|
Subject: | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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