Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marini, Marco ; Rodano, Giorgio |
Institutions: | Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Urbino |
Subject: | Endogenous Timing | Cooperation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 1112 18 pages |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection |
Source: |
-
Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games.
Currarini, Sergio, (2011)
-
Welfare Enhancing Coordination in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly.
Marini, Marco, (2013)
-
STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY.
Kopel, Michael, (2013)
- More ...
-
The strategic timing of R&D agreements.
Marini, Marco, (2011)
-
Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games.
Currarini, Sergio, (2011)
-
Welfare Enhancing Coordination in Consumer Cooperatives under Mixed Oligopoly.
Marini, Marco, (2013)
- More ...