Leading With(Out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Glöckner, Andreas ; Irlenbusch, Bernd ; Kube, Sebastian ; Nicklisch, Andreas ; Normann, Hans-Theo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Series:	MPI Collective Goods Preprint ; No. 2009/8
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1361649 [DOI]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209823