Learning in repeated auctions with budgets : regret minimization and equilibrium
Year of publication: |
June 28, 2018
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Authors: | Balseiro, Santiago R. ; Gur, Yonatan |
Publisher: |
[Stanford, CA] : [Stanford Graduate School of Business] |
Subject: | Sequential auctions | online advertising | online learning | stochastic optimization | stochastic approximation | incomplete information | regret analysis | dynamic games | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Lernprozess | Learning process | Online-Marketing | Internet marketing | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | E-Learning | E-learning |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Stanford University Graduate School of Business research paper. - Rochester, NY : Social Science Electronic Publishing, ZDB-ID 2865911-9. - Vol. no. 17, 18] |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2921446 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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