Limiting Sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Ichihashi, Shota |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 117.2019, p. 276-288
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Information design | Information disclosure | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Signalling | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Kommunikation | Communication | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination |
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