Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance : preventing bank panics without moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Martin, Antoine |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 28.2006, 1, p. 197-211
|
Subject: | Bankenliquidität | Bank liquidity | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
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