Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders

We investigate a free-entry market in which incumbents engage in lobbying for changing regulations, which affect the cost of all firms equally. We find that incumbents have incentive to weaken or strengthen regulations, depending on the demand condition.

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Year of publication:	2016-09-08
Authors:	Matsumura, Toshihiro ; Yamagishi, Atsushi

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Matsumura, Toshihiro and Yamagishi, Atsushi (2016): Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders.
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015254128