Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Sandholm, William H.
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 5.2010, 1, p. 27-50
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Evolutionary game dynamics \| ESS

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE505 [DOI] 895170884 [GVK] hdl:10419/150131 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:505 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599422