Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Sandholm, William H. ; Hofbauer, Josef
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 6.2011, 3, p. 341-377
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Evolutionary game theory \| evolutionary game dynamics \| nonconvergnece \| dominated strategies

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE771 [DOI] 894767844 [GVK] hdl:10419/150158 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:771 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599449