Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal
Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Marchegiani, Lucia ; Reggiani, Tommaso ; Rizzolli, Matteo |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 131.2016, 1, p. 183-197
|
Subject: | Performance appraisal | Type I and Type II errors | Leniency bias | Severity bias | Economic experiment | Loss aversion | Reference-dependent preferences | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Experiment | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Personalbeurteilung | Employee appraisal | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Verlust | Loss | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance |
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