Lottery versus all-pay auction contests : a revenue dominance theorem
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Franke, Jörg ; Kanzow, Christian ; Leininger, Wolfgang ; Schwartz, Alexandra |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 83.2014, p. 116-126
|
Subject: | All-pay auction | Lottery contest | Optimal bias | Revenue | Exclusion principle | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Glücksspiel | Gambling | Wettbewerb | Competition | Einnahmen |
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