Management earnings forecasts as a performance target in executive compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Otomasa, Shota ; Shiiba, Atsushi ; Shuto, Akinobu |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting, auditing & finance : JAAF. - London [u.a.] : Sage Publ., ISSN 2160-4061, ZDB-ID 2067574-4. - Vol. 35.2020, 1, p. 139-167
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Subject: | executive compensation contracts | performance target | pay-for-performance sensitivity | management forecast error | initial forecast innovation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prognoseverfahren | Forecasting model | Prognose | Forecast | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Gewinn | Profit | Aktienoption | Stock option | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement |
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