Merger and acquisition targets : the role of moral hazard and acquiring firm executive compensation
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kline, William A. ; Brown, Richard S. |
Published in: |
Journal of managerial issues : JMI. - Pittsburg, Kan. : PSU, ISSN 1045-3695, ZDB-ID 1131458-8. - Vol. 31.2019, 2, p. 119-136
|
Subject: | Übernahme | Takeover | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Betriebswirtschaftliches Ziel | Corporate objective | USA | United States |
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