Merger and Collusion in Contests

Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Huck, Steffen ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Müller, Wieland
Published in:	Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 158.2002, 4, p. 563-563

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005241788