Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fristrup, Peter |
Other Persons: | Keiding, Hans (contributor) |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 15.1998, 3, p. 455-467
|
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory |
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