Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable
Year of publication: |
2002-05-01
|
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Authors: | Echenique, Federico ; Edlin, Aaron |
Institutions: | Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), Walter A. Haas School of Business |
Subject: | mixed-strategy equilibrium | learning | supermodular games | strategic complementaries | equilibrium selection | Social and Behavioral Sciences |
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