Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

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Year of publication:	2002-05-01
Authors:	Echenique, Federico ; Edlin, Aaron S.
Institutions:	Institute of Business and Economic Research (IBER), Walter A. Haas School of Business
Subject:	mixed-strategy equilibrium \| learning \| supermodular games \| strategic complementarities \| equilibrium selection \| economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Competition Policy Center
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843451