Monetary accommodation and unemployment: Why central bank transparency matters.

Recent contributions have shown that in the presence of strategic interactions be- tween non atomistic unions and the central bank, an accommodating monetary policy rule may increase equilibrium unemployment. This note demonstrates that this result can be reversed considering the case where the central bank is not fully transparent concerning its reaction to wage decisions.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Spyromitros, Eleftherios ; Zimmer, Blandine
Institutions:	Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Strasbourg
Subject:	Monetary regime \| Wage setting \| Central bank transparency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers of BETA.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit ; J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422854