Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

Optimal delegation restores the beneficial effects of non-accommodating monetary policy when the central bank is allowed to be not fully transparent about its response to wages.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Sánchez, Marcelo
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 3, p. 392-396
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Wage setting \| Central bank transparency \| Monetary strictness \| Optimal delegation \| Calibration

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages ; E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit ; J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041730