Monitoring by busy compensation committee members
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pan, Hunghua ; Liao, Yi-Ping ; Yu, Chen-Chiao |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 2026509-8. - Vol. 89.2024, 1, p. 1557-1568
|
Subject: | Compensation committee | Excess executive compensation | Overpayment | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
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