Monitoring Team Production by Design

This work addresses the optimal design of the monitoring technology for a team when collective liability can not form. It shows that the principal's optimal design choice is then to concentrate monitoring on the less productive agent in a team. By controlling the less productive agent she fully discipline the more productive. This result helps in studying the interplay between the institutional set-up and the technological capabilities of teams

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Bono, Giovanni
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Subject:	Arbeitsgruppe \| Leistungsbeurteilung \| Theorie

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 540
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4750 [DOI] 497318784 [GVK] hdl:10419/159381 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:540 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651434