Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Sugaya, Takuo ; Wolitzky, Alexander |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 91.2023, 5, p. 1727-1761
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Subject: | blind game | folk theorem | frequent actions | monitoring precision | occupation measure | Repeated games | variance decomposition | χ2-divergence | Wiederholte Spiele | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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