Moral hazard and the optimality of debt
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hébert, Benjamin |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 85.2018, 4/305, p. 2214-2252
|
Subject: | Security design | Moral hazard | Optimal contracts | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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